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High house prices are often considered to be beneficial for the elderly due to the accumulation 
of wealth. However, as land is an input in the provision of public services, the elderly might be 
harmed by them, for example, due to a shortage of local care homes. Alternatively, care home 
providers might be attracted by asset-rich potential clients, which could lead to a positive effect 
of house prices on the provision of care. Applying an instrumental variables approach on 
English data, we show that higher house prices lead to fewer care homes, fewer entries into the 
market as well as fewer available beds.  
Keywords: Care homes, house prices, long-term care, England 





                                                   
* Newcastle University. 5 Barrack Rd, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4SE 
+Corresponding author: e.gonzalo-almorox@newcastle.ac.uk 
All analyses used Stata 14. Do-Files are available from the corresponding author on request. All analyses and 
opinions expressed in this paper as well as any possible errors are under the sole responsibility of the authors. The 
land registry data is released under Open Government Licence for public sector information 
(http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/). The land registry data covers the 
transactions received at the Land Registry in the period October 1st, 2014 to September 30th, 2016 and is covered 
by Crown copyright. If you have found an error with the data, please contact Her Majesty's Land Registry 
(HMLR).  
Authors thank Àlex Pérez-Laborda, Luke Munford and participants at the 5th PhD Student Workshop in Industrial 
and Public Economics in Universitat Rovira I Virgili and the Health Economics Study Group in Aberdeen for 
helpful comments and suggestions in early versions of the paper. Financial support from ESRC is gratefully 
acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.  
 
	 2	
1. Introduction  
 
The English housing sector has experienced the fastest growth in real prices amongst all OECD 
countries over the last decades. Between 1997 and 2016 the median price paid for residential 
property increased by almost 260%, while median individual earnings increased by 68% 
(Henretty, 2017). A widely-discussed consequence of this process has been an affordability 
crisis that has particularly affected young and first-time buyers. These two groups have 
struggled to access mortgages and raise the necessary initial deposits to invest in housing 
(Hilber, 2017, Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). At the same time, older home-owners are believed 
to benefit from this situation, as they were able to buy properties cheaply and now benefit from 
increases in housing wealth – even though realizing these gains obviously depend on the 
decision by the older homeowners to sell their properties and live in a cheaper area or smaller 
properties (Hilber and Schoni, 2016, Hiller and Lerbs, 2016). In this paper, however, we point 
out that the picture might be more complicated. Areas with high house prices, may inhibit the 
opening of new care homes, which in turn harms older home owners if these either cannot 
access sufficient care, have to delay their entry in a nearby care home or are forced to relocate 
in old age and consequently leave behind existing personal networks and connections.   
The demand for long term care services that involve health care and help with activities of daily 
living has increased substantially over the last decades. A main factor for this increase has been 
an ageing population. Hence, the proportion of people with at least one difficulty has increased 
from 16.4% at age 65 to almost 50% at age 85 (AgeUk, 2017). In addition, changes to family 
structures and living habits have also led to a shift towards paid formal care provision by 
nursing and residential care homes instead of more informal care within the (extended) family 
(Kaschowitz and Brandt, 2017; van Groenou and De Boer, 2016). 
This paper investigates the relationship between housing and long term care markets. Our 
analysis can be motivated by figures 1 and 2 that show large spatial disparities in the local 
availability of care homes (figure 1) as well as a wide variation in property prices (figure 2) 
across English districts. The direction of an eventual link between these two variables is a priori 
unclear. While higher house prices lead to increases in wealth for existing home owners, many 
of which are old, and thus to greater funds available to pay for care in old age (Darton et al., 
2010), the opening of care homes requires space. Consequently, higher house prices lead to 
higher input prices for care home providers, which should lower the supply of care homes for 
a given demand. A possible consequence is that the available long term care choices are 
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reduced for people living in these areas. The overall effect of higher house prices on the 
provision of social care then depends on the relative size of these two effects. 
(Figures 1 and 2 about here.) 
We use data for care home from the Care Quality Commission, the official regulator for care 
homes in England, which we combine with data on all housing transactions from the Land 
Registry, a government department founded in 1862 that serves as the central registry for all 
land owners in England and Wales. Considering a context of health and healthcare, the former 
dataset has been used to analyse the effects of housing book on individual health (Fichera and 
Gathergood, 2016). From these sources, we construct a local authority-level dataset for 
England from 2011 to 2016. A potential problem of the analysis is that long term care providers 
may choose local markets on the basis of unobservable variables that also affect house prices. 
If this occurs, the estimated effects of the house prices may be biased. To overcome this 
potential limitation, we use an identification strategy based on Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) 
that exploits differences in the tightness of planning regulations and in the share of available 
land across English local authorities. Our key findings suggest that higher house prices indeed 
lead to fewer care homes. Moreover, we also find some evidence of quality upgrading where 
areas with higher house prices have more care homes rated as “outstanding” and some weaker 
evidence for a corresponding increase in the number of care homes rated as “bad”. 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the study of the residential long term care 
market in England. Our main contribution is to provide the first evidence for a causal link 
between house prices and long term care provision. The analysis of the former relationship, in 
addition of providing significant insights about the organization of formal social care services, 
is also important given the key role played by value of the properties in the definition of the 
means tests that determine the eligibility for public support as well as define several sources of 
funding to meet local spending needs. The provision of long term care has been analysed by a 
number of authors. Forder and Allan (2014), using cross-sectional data, provide a detailed 
analysis of elements that determine competition amongst care homes and assess the 
consequences of this competition for both prices and quality. Using the house prices as an 
indicator of the payer composition, their results show a negative correlation between the prices 
paid for care home services and the prices of nearby houses. Likewise, they find a positive 
correlation between the house prices and probability of a care home obtaining a higher quality 
rating. Other authors, have explored the dynamics of the care home market by analysing 
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elements that lead to care homes closures. Netten et al. (2003, 2005), find that closures may be 
associated with the prices set in the care homes. Hence, lower prices would lead to higher closer 
rates. Allan and Forder (2015) explore other element such as the quality and show that poorer 
quality and more competitive markets are elements that increase the probability of market exits. 
In contrast to this research, our paper joins Machin et al. (2002) on providing evidence on 
factors related to entries into the care home market. Their results suggest that the introduction 
of the UK national minimum wage had a negative, but statistically insignificant effect on care 
home entries. Our paper is also related to Mc Millen and Powers (2017) who analyse the factors 
that determine location decisions of care homes. Considering the market of nursing care homes 
in California and using a spatial econometrics approach, they conclude that nursing care homes 
tend to locate in densely inhabited areas with older and wealthier populations.  
This paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the main institutional 
characteristics characterising the market for long term care and housing. Section 3 describes 
the data and the empirical strategy Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes. 
2. Institutional background 
In England, urban planning and long term care are organised on the level of local government, 
specifically in local authorities. These are roughly comparable to US counties and usually 
encompass one city or some larger rural area. Some areas have a two-tier structure with some 
decisions taken at the (lower) district council level and others at the (higher) county council 
level, while others are unitary authorities that combine both tiers.  
Urban planning is managed at the district level. Local planning decisions are based on a 
National Planning Framework that guides policies and development decisions to meet local 
socio-economic, cultural, security and health needs. Local planning policies have long been 
regarded as one of the main constraints on the housing supply and a main reason for the increase 
in house prices1. English planning regulations are more restrictive than other countries 
(Cheshire, 2009; Hilber, 2015). In addition, they can lead to incentives for existing home 
owners to promote “not in my backyard” policies that restrict local development and 
consequently the supply of local housing.  These tighter regulations lead to increases in the 
                                                   
1 In addition, the effects of planning regulations have been studied also in other contexts such as the retail sector 
for the UK (Cheshire et al., (2014), Griffith and Harmgart, (2008), Haskel and Sadun, (2012), Sadun, (2015) 
France (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002), Italy (Schivardi and Viviano, 2011) or Spain (Sanchez Vidal, 2016). 
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land value of those areas already developed. Conversely, for owners in less developed areas 
these policies imply a cost (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013). 
Long term care is managed by 152 local authorities that operate at the council level.2 The main 
responsibility entails the commissioning (i.e., the purchase) of care services for those clients 
eligible for public support. Since the mid-eighties, the provision of long term care operates 
according to market mechanisms. As a result, the for profit private sector has emerged as the 
main provider. In 2014, 74% of the total places belonged to a private provider compared with 
8% of places provided by the public sector. The remaining 18% of the places were provided 
by the voluntary sector (Jarret, 2017) 
There are 19 private and 6 voluntary providers that have a combined market share of about a 
30% of the beds available. Within these, 4 providers are big chains with a combined market 
share of 15%. The remaining 70% of the market share is served by smaller providers that 
individually provide no more than 0.4% of the beds each. The resulting market is considered 
to be fairly competitive, but also regionally fragmented.3 
One explanation for these regional discrepancies is the composition of long term care recipients 
in each local authority. Care homes may have two types of clients depending on how they fund 
their services. The first are private clients who purchase and fund their care individually based 
on their willingness to pay for different types of services. The second are clients whose care is 
partially or fully funded by the local authorities. The eligibility and degree of this public 
support is based on a means-test that assesses their financial capacity. The market for this type 
of clients works as a quasi-market in which the local authorities purchase care services from 
private providers on behalf of the clients (Le Grand, 1991)4. The proportion of publicly funded 
clients is notably higher than the number of self-funded clients (Jarret, 2017). 
The fact that local authorities purchase care on behalf of a significant part of the demand, 
suggests that they may have certain buyer power when negotiating the fees applied to publicly 
                                                   
2 Before 2008, these activities were managed by Primary Care Trusts (PCT), which were the top tier administrative 
structure of the National Health Service. The Health and Social Care Act (2008) transferred public health matters, 
including long term care activities, from these PCTs to local authorities. In other areas, PCTs were replaced by 
clinical commissioning groups (CCG). 
3 Considering registered care homes in all sectors, the South East is the region that has more registered care homes 
(currently more than 1,000). This proportion of care homes contrasts with the North East where there are about 
360 registered care homes. 
4 The same approach has been applied for the delivery of various public services in the UK. Using the nursing and 
residential care market, Barron and West (2017) analyse the performance of different types of providers in terms 
quality standards. Their main result suggests that facilities that operate in quasi-markets are, on average, of higher 
quality than those operated by for profit providers. 
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funded clients. This power pushes prices down and lead to lower fees paid by the local 
authorities for the same services that private payers receive. This case suggests a potential cross 
subsidisation of privately funded clients to publicly funded clients. This situation has been 
documented both in the English long term care market (Forder and Allan, 2014, Hancock and 
Hviid, 2010, OFT, 2005) and in the US (Grabowski, 2004, Mukamel and Spector, 2002).  
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
3.1 Data 
We obtain data for local authorities that operate at district level from various sources for the 
period October 2014 to September 2016. The choice of the time period is determined by the 
availability of some of the data. Information concerning the characteristics of care homes is 
obtained from the CQC directory of active and inactive care homes5. The data contain all 
registrations of care homes that have carried out a regulated activity since 2010. The initial 
sample includes 24,354 records. A substantive proportion of these registrations (16,054) that 
were carried out during 2010 and the first two months of 2011 due to a new legal requirement 
for existing providers to be registered with the Care Quality Commission. Restricting the data 
to the period from October 2014 leaves us with data on 1844 care homes.  
We consider the entry date of a specific care home to be the date of registration. We also drop 
registrations that are due to organisational reasons such as changes in the address or take overs 
from a different provider6. From this information and the address of the care home, we calculate 
our main dependent variable as the number of care homes per 1000 population that are aged 65 
or over in the local authority. This definition is based on Tokunaga and Hashimoto (2013) who 
analyse the entry of private providers in Japanese long term care markets. Population data 
comes from the projections of the Office of National Statistics for the years 2015 and 2016. 
The former figures are mid-year estimates as of 30th of June of each year. 
Furthermore, we analyse the effect of the house prices on market entry. We calculate market 
entry rates adopting an ecological approach that considers the number of new registered care 
homes relative to the number of incumbents at the beginning of the period. This definition of 
                                                   
5 This dataset is maintained by the CQC Directorate of Data and Statistics and available upon request. 
6 This situation is typically found when dealing with information contained in registries of firms. Neglecting it, 
apart from potentially introducing measurement errors, may lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the market 
dynamics and the performance of the firm. Geurts and Van Biesebroeck (2016), for instance, analyse the effect of 
this measurement problem on the estimations of the firm’s growth after the entry in the market 
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entry rates is a relative measure to compare the process of entry in markets with different sizes 
(Audretsch and Fritsch, 1994). 
The data provide further information on the number of beds in each care home, the postcode 
and postal address, the city and region where the care home is located as well as the local 
authority that is responsible for the purchase of social care services for publicly funded clients. 
We use this information to generate two further outcomes, namely the number of newly 
registered beds in a period as well as the average size of existing care homes.  
We also use information on care homes’ quality ratings from the inspection system 
implemented by the CQC since October 2014. The main changes incorporated with this new 
system were essentially two. First, inspections conducted without prior announcement. Also, 
more systematic and structured inspections. Thereby, the evaluation consider explicitly five 
quality components of the services that include the safety, the effectivity, the level of care and 
response to people’s needs as well as the management and leadership of the services. In 
addition to these individual assessments, the CQC also releases an overall evaluation of the 
services. We use this general measure for our analysis. Besides, each of these quality 
dimensions is assessed according to four possible ratings namely outstanding, good, requires 
improvement or inadequate. We merge the latter categories i.e. requires improvement and 
inadequate into a single category bad. For working out these ratings, inspectors use a variety 
of sources that include quantitative measures as well as the feedback from residents and 
relatives.  
For our analysis, we collapse this data on the level of 315 (district-level) local authorities and 
two time periods from October 2014 to September 2015 and October 2015 to September 2016. 
Some of the variables we use are measured before 2008. This creates a potential issue as the 
English local government was restructured in 2008 resulting in the transformation of some 
counties into new Unitary Authorities. Our main analysis uses only those local authorities that 
did not undergo any changes. Additionally, we have rerun all analyses using averaged values 
for these new Unitary Authorities. Results are essentially identical. 
Information on property prices is obtained from the price paid dataset released on a monthly 
basis by the Land Registry. This dataset contains all the transactions of properties carried out 
in England and Wales since 1995. In addition to the price paid and the exact date of the 
transaction, the dataset includes further information such as the type of property, the address, 
the city, district and region where the property is located as well as whether the location was 
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newly built and whether the property was under leasehold or freehold7. We aggregate this 
information on the same level as the care home and obtain the average price8 for each time 
period. 
3.2 Identification 
We estimate regressions that follow the general form !"#$ = & + ()*+,"#$ + -# + .$ + /"#$																							(1) 
      
where Yit is the respective outcome variable i.e., proportion of care homes per 1000 population 
over 65, entry rates, number of newly registered beds and average size of entrant care home, 
for a local authority i in time period t. Pit is the average house price. We also include -  and .  which are dummy variables for each region where the local authority is located and for the 
time period. The rationale of these variables is to control for all those factors, observed and 
unobserved, that are constant within each region and time. We are interested in estimating (.		An important concern related to the OLS estimates of (	in (1), is that they are likely to be 
biased as we can easily imagine unobserved factors that influence both house prices and the 
provision of care homes. For example, the general wealth of an area. In addition, we can also 
imagine potential reverse causality between the number of care homes and the level of house 
prices if care homes are a (dis-) amenity that changes the quality of the neighbourhood and 
potentially the values of the properties in an area. A potential candidate to address these 
problem would be the use of the index of deprivation as a control. However, it presents the 
concern that it can be related to the house prices and it may produce endogeneity limitations. 
In order to tackle these problems, it is necessary to obtain a source of exogenous variation in 
the house prices. For doing that, we borrow an identification strategy from Hilber and 
Vermeulen (2016) who consider the link between supply side constraints, such as the available 
land and the tightness of planning regulations, and house prices in England. As 
contemporaneous measures in supply side constraints are likely to be endogenous and therefore 
they use a variety of instruments. Their findings confirm that tighter supply constraints, such 
as less available lands and more restrictive planning regulation, lead to increases in the prices. 
                                                   
7 The difference between these two types of properties is based on the whether the ownership of the land or 
property is for a temporary (leasehold) or unrestricted (freehold) period. 
8 The average price is calculated applying the geometric mean. This method has been adopted by the Land 
Registry instead of the arithmetic mean in order to correct the potential skewness from high property values.   
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In our case, we use their instruments to instrument for our treatment variable, house prices. The 
rationale of our identification strategy is that if a variable (2) it is used as an instrument for 
addressing the endogeneity that the supply constrains (3) may have when establishing the 
causal link with the house prices (4), as Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) show with their first and 
second stage estimates, then this variable 2 can be also considered as a valid instrument for 
addressing the endogeneity in the house prices (4). We illustrate the former in figure (3). 
(Figure 3 about here) 
Hilber and Vermeulen use two instruments for the tightness of local planning regulations. The 
first, is based on the impact of a planning reform aimed at speeding up the planning processes. 
Set in 2002, this reform included the establishment of an explicit target for concluding major 
development projects with explicit aim of avoiding delays of major projects. Local authorities 
had incentives to reach this target as funds from the central government could be retained 
otherwise. The instrument used by Hilber and Vermeulen (and us) is the change in the delay 
rate of major projects pre- and post-reform. The underlying logic is that more restrictive local 
authorities likely had more delays pre-reform and consequently had to change their behaviour 
more strongly than more permissive local authorities after the reform. A potential criticism of 
this instrument is that the effects of this regulation may have affected to certain extent the 
development and provision of care homes in a local authority.  If this is the case, then local 
authorities with greater differences in their delay rates would be those more restrictive and in 
principle would reject more planning projects that would include also care homes. In figure 3 
we show the relationship between the average delay rates and the number of care homes per 
1000 people older than 65 for each local authority. Delay rates do not influence on the number 
of care homes (ρ = 0.023). Two reasons may explain this weak association. Firstly, major 
projects and more in general the design of planning regulations, mostly refer to projects that 
involve dwellings. Residential care homes normally fall under a different category that 
integrates care facilities such as hospitals or nursing care homes. In these cases, the applications 
may not be tested considering the housing development plans and may be approved despite the 
limits imposed by future settlements (King 2011). Likewise, the development of care homes 
planning also involves other local authorities different to the local planning authorities. Thus, 
in two-tier authorities, the county local authorities are in charge of the funding and commission 
of the services. Their aims may be different from the purposes of the local authorities that 
manage planning regulations.  
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(Figure 4 about here) 
Hilber and Vermeulen’s second instrument links local planning regulations to local political 
power. In addition to Hilber and Vermeulen (2016), similar strategies have been used by other 
authors such Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) or Sadun (2015). The information used here 
corresponds to the share of the Labour party in the General Election of 1983 at the local district 
level. Hilber and Vermeulen obtain and compile these data at the level of the Constituency 
boundaries and then match them to the level of the local district authority by using GIS 
techniques. The underlying logic of this instrument is that Labour voters were historically 
predominantly low- and middle-income, and working-class. These voters gain from additional 
construction activity, both through more easily affordable homes and additional jobs. 
Furthermore, they are unlikely to own (more expensive) houses that could lose in value. Using 
data from a general election also ensures that local concerns, such as those related to housing, 
do not play a dominant role in voters’ decisions. Our regressions additionally include the 
Labour vote share in the most recent general election (June 2015). By using this variable we 
aim to control for changes in the demographic composition of areas that may lead to a more 
Labour-friendly population and may alter the voting behaviour and consequently the 
corresponding local policies. Cheshire et al (2015), for example, allude to the case of some 
neighbourhoods in London receiving important proportions of new wealthy residents when 
analysing the relationship between supply restrictions and housing vacancies.  
Hilber and Vermeulen additionally look at physical constraints as another mechanism that may 
restrict the supply of houses. The share of developed land may be subject to endogeneity 
concerns given that it may be discretionarily determined by the local authorities. To correct for 
these potential problems, we instrument the share of developed land with the population density 
in 1911 with the underlying logic that land is pricier in historically more densely populated 
areas.9 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for our estimation sample. On average, over the 
period of analysis there were about 1 care homes per 1000 population over 65. Looking at the 
                                                   
9 Data on the instruments comes from the replication data from Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) available at Christian 
Hilber’s website: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hilber/. A copy of this data is also available as the supporting 
information in the electronic copy of the article. The Appendix provides a detailed explanation and description 
referred to the computation of the data used. 
	 11	
care homes that are inspected, we can see that there is a surprisingly low number of care homes 
that are rated as outstanding. Conversely, the average number of care homes that are rated as 
“bad” per 1000 population over 65 is 0.33. Likewise, Table 1 provides further information on 
the dynamics of the market. Entry rates vary substantially across the sample with a 
comparatively low average of 1.97%. Nevertheless, some local authorities reach values as high 
as 18.75%. The average size of the new care homes since October 2014 is 11 beds with a 
minimum of zero (equivalent to no new homes entering) and a maximum of 135. Local 
authorities gain on average 15 new care home beds per period. House prices are also highly 
variable across regions with an average of £245,036, but a range at the lower end of 71,447 
and more than £1M for some local authorities in London.  
Table 2 shows the results corresponding to the first stage statistics for our estimation. We 
combine the instruments related to the regulatory constraints and the instrument for the physical 
constraint. The first two columns, present estimates that use the change in the delay rate and 
the local share of Labour voters in combination with the historical population density (columns 
(1) and (2) respectively). Column (3) considers all the instruments.  The estimates point at the 
direction that we would expect from Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) - the relaxation of planning 
constraints lowers house prices, while higher (historical) population densities increase them. 
Likewise, the results associated with the local share of Labour voters also confirm the negative 
relationship presented before. The bottom of Table (2) presents Sanderson-Windmeijer (2016) 
multivariate F-tests for the excluded instruments. These evade the problem that simple F-tests 
in the case of multiple instruments can be misleading as they could mask a combination of 
strong and weak instruments. These results indicate the absence of any weak identification 
problems for all our endogenous regressors. Moreover, all the F statistics are above 10 which 
is the value suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) as acceptable to reject the null hypothesis 
of weak instruments.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
4. Results  
 
Table 3 looks at the link between contemporaneous house prices and the number of care home 
per 1000 population over 65 as well as the house prices and the rate of market entry. In both 
cases, the results reported in column (1) show OLS estimates, while columns (2) to (4) present 
various IV specifications. All our estimates suggest that higher house prices decrease the 
number of care homes. The effects, which in general are significant at the 1% level, indicate 
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that an increase of a 100% in the level of prices entail reductions of 0.9 to 0.5 care homes per 
1000 population over 65. Expressed in terms of standard deviations, our results suggest that 
1% increase in the log of the house prices lowers the number of care homes by a range of 127% 
to 240% of a standard deviation. These results depend on whether we include the whole set of 
just one of the instruments concerning the regulatory constraints. In any case, these results 
suggest that the production cost effect derived from higher house prices dominates any eventual 
demand effect operating through potential clients becoming wealthier. 
The right panel in Table 3 considers the impact of house prices on the entry rates of care homes..  
Again, we find a negative causal relationship between the house prices and the entry dynamics 
of the market; increases in house prices deter care homes from entering in those markets. 
Specifically, a 1-log point increase in house prices reduces the entry rate by up to 2.4 percentage 
points with the specification using the Labour share as an instrument for planning regulations. 
This estimate is very similar to the case when we instrument considering all the instruments. 
In terms of standard deviations, these results suggest that an increase of 1% in the house prices 
lead to decreases of the entry rates between 68% and 73% of a standard deviation depending 
on the instruments used.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
A potential concern is that the decision of entry in the market may be lagged to certain extent. 
For instance, providers may base their decision to enter a local market on historical house prices 
or the date of registration of the care home may differ from the date of the purchase of the 
property. Table 4 explores the effects of lagged house prices on the number of care homes and 
entry rates respectively. We apply a lag of 2 years in the house prices. The choice of this lag 
fits the time frame required for setting up and opening a care home. This process entails not 
only the construction of the building but also the application of “statement of purpose” and the 
confirmation of a registration. The effects using the lagged price, although lower, are generally 
along the same lines as the findings presented in Table 3. Thus these findings suggest that 
potential different time frames do not affect our analysis. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
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In general, these findings suggest that the decision of entry by long term care providers in local 
markets may respond mainly to financial incentives that determine the cost of development10. 
Investing in the development of a care home in areas where the value of alternative uses of 
land, such as housing, are high, may entail high opportunity costs. Developers may prefer to 
develop houses instead of care homes despite having a potential demand. Furthermore, in order 
to develop a new care home, developers have to compete with other types of developers such 
as house builders for getting available land. Due to their greater profit margins, house builders 
may be willing to pay higher prices for a site. Also, both local and national funding schemes 
do not contribute to provide the right incentives for the development of new care homes either. 
For instance, at local level the charge of the Community Infrastructure Levy on net additional 
spaces which are required in a care home but that are not subject to rental revenues – laundries, 
common rooms, or the reluctance in some cases to grant planning permissions, may difficult 
the viability and therefore disincentivise the development of new care homes (Campbell, 2015). 
Other grants at national level such as the New Homes Bonus pay local councils for creating 
new homes in their area.  
We also observe how house prices affect the capacity of those care homes registered since 
October 2014. We consider the capacity from two perspectives: the total number of beds newly 
registered in a local authority and the average size of the care homes registered in the local 
authority.  The results of the impact of the house prices are reported in Table 5. We find 
evidence of a negative effect so that higher house prices lead to the registration of fewer beds 
and smaller care homes. Yet in most of the cases, these effects are statistically insignificant. 
They are only significant at the 10% level for the average care home size when instrumenting 
with the Labour share of voters. These findings suggest that a 1% increase in the house prices 
imply a reduction in the average size of the newly registered house of about a 62% of a standard 
deviation.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Although these results are not conclusive in terms of statistical significance, they are consistent 
across the different specifications that we use. We can outline two implications derived from 
them. First, older populations living in areas where house prices are high would face a 
                                                   




restriction in the long-term care choices available to them. Particularly there would be fewer 
beds available for them. Second, despite having fewer options regarding the provision of care, 
the services could be of better quality. Bigger care homes tend to have lower levels of quality 
since they encounter more difficulties to provide a more personalised care (Barron and West, 
2017). A core characteristic considered by CQC in those services rated as good and outstanding 
is their capacity to engage with patients, their families and carers in order to meet people´s 
diverse needs (CQC, 2016). 
We explore this quality aspect in further detail.  In addition to the differences in quality derived 
from a different care home dimension, it may be possible that house prices affect directly on 
quality level in the care home. There is evidence that care homes rely on privately-funded 
clients to cross-subsidize publicly-funded clients. Humphries et al. (2016) argue that this 
strategy is followed by a number of long term care providers in order to preserve their financial 
viability. This argument would suggest that areas with a greater proportion of clients that self-
fund their care should be more attractive for care homes. 
Given that self-funded clients in the UK are price takers, they also choose which care home 
they use. In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that they prefer better care homes over 
worse. If higher house prices imply more asset-rich clients who can afford better care, care 
homes can execute a vertical quality differentiation in those areas and set higher fees for 
services of better quality. If this occurs, we would expect a positive effect of house prices on 
the quality of care homes in an area. 
Table 6 reports the results of the effect of house prices on the number of care homes per old 
population by quality rating. The left panel shows information on the care homes that are rated 
overall as outstanding. The IV estimates reveal a positive effect of the house prices on the 
number that obtain an outstanding rating. Specifically, a 1% increase in house prices leads to 
an increase in the number of care homes rated as outstanding by approximately three quarters 
of a standard deviation. Yet, these results are only statistically significant at the 10% level 
possibly due to the small number of care homes that are rated as outstanding and the small 
sample of the analysis.  Regarding the number of care homes with a bad rating, those care 
homes that require improvement or are inadequate, a similar increase in house prices leads to 
a negative and statistically significant effect, equal to nearly 110% of a standard deviation. 
These results are consistent with the reasoning above, namely that care homes would be 
upgrading and improving their quality to capture asset-rich private clients. The smaller 
	 15	
magnitude of the effect associated with the OLS specifications in relationship with the effects 
of IV estimations reassure the idea that endogeneity problems would not be addressed properly 
in the former cases. These confirms the importance of the IV estimates that account for 
endogeneity.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
We contribute to the existing literature on long term care by investigating the causal link 
between house prices and the provision of social care in England. Our findings suggest that 
high house prices have a hitherto unexplored social cost that implies a reduction in the 
provision of long term care. Our estimates show reductions in the number of care homes and 
the entry rates. Likewise, we find a negative effect of the prices on the average size of care 
homes, albeit not robust statistically. A potential implication of these results is that high house 
prices are not as uniformly beneficial to older home-owners as often implied in public debates. 
That being said, we do find evidence that higher house prices go hand in hand with better 
quality rated care homes, suggesting that care home providers might be motivated by a desire 
to attract asset-rich private clients. These findings would be in line with the results from 
McMillen and Powers (2017) who show evidence with regards to the prevalence of nursing 
care homes to locate in areas with older and wealthier people or Stevenson and Grabowski 
(2010) that show similar results for the case of assisted living facilities 
Our findings also lend support to the idea that the development of care homes is driven by 
financial incentives. High house prices suggest that projects which undertake alternative 
developments to care homes, such as building property houses for example, are a more 
attractive option for developers’ investment. This is because of two core reasons. Housing 
development entails less opportunity costs and higher profit margins that lead to a better 
bargaining power for accessing to available developable land. Likewise, the development of 
care homes is associated with less fiscal incentives, both at local and national level. Regarding 
this, our findings illustrate potentially important interactions between various areas, such as 
urban planning and the provision of social care that are responsibility of local authorities at 
different level. Our results can contribute to inform the reforms based on an increase of the 
local government funding and that directly involve the housing market and that present 
substantial trade-offs. For instance, the introduction of new national grants, such as the New 
Homes Bonus in 2011, aiming at encouraging the development of new residential properties, 
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may compromise the provision of long term care. Notwithstanding, the funding derived from 
these grants may be used to alleviate the current funding needs in the social care. Disentangling 
these relationships, given the context of constant reforms in the local public finance, may be a 
future avenue of research.  
 
These findings should be read alongside the current funding schemes for social care where the 
value of the properties plays a key role, especially for those people residing in care homes. In 
these cases, the value of the property is included in for means-test that determines the public 
support buy the local authorities. Likewise, the value of the property is considered for assuming 
the cost of deferred payments in those patients that are in a care home and decide to postpone 
the payment of their care. Under these situations, homes can be sold to pay the local authorities. 
Hence, from the perspective of a local authority, higher house prices would entail greater 
revenues that could be used to meet its funding requirements. Likewise, higher house prices 
could also contribute to increase the council tax, which is the main important source of local 
revenue and that is partially used for meeting the needs of local governments in terms of long 
term care. Despite long term care has been an area relatively protected from the budgetary 
constraints occurred since 2010 (Smith et al. 2016), both local authorities and national 
government need to agree in a funding scheme to meet the rising needs and the challenges 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
  Nobs Mean Minimum Maximum Stdev 
Care homes per 1000 
population over 65  630 1.0826 0.2067 2.5524 0.3646 
Entry rate (%) 630 1.9704 0 18.75 3.1533 
New registered beds 630 15.4984 0 219 30.9596 
Average size 630 10.7252 0 135 21.5908 
Care homes per quality 
(outstanding) 630 0.0060 0 0.1049 0.0164 
Care homes per quality 
(bad) 630 0.3325 0 1.9555 0.2006 
Average house price 630 245,036 71,447 1,275,969 133,925 
Change delay rate 630 -0.0376 -0.6345 0.5310 0.2197 
Historical share of 
Labour votes 630 0.1625 0.0010 0.4103 0.0886 
Population density 1911 630 774.6749 3.2504 22,0288 2,634 
Share Labour voters 






Table 2: First stage results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Historical share of Labour voters    -0.9790*** -0.9663*** 
    (0.2471) (0.2491) 
Change delay rate -0.1698   -0.1118** 
  (0.067)   (0.0563) 
Density population 1911 0.0000361*** 0.0000468*** 0.0000476*** 
  (8.34e-06) (7.77e-06) (7.57e-06) 
Observations 630 630 630 
Number of local authorities  315 315 315 
R-squared -0.0270 0.1139 0.1102 
Sanderson-Windmeijer F test of excluded 
instruments 11.71*** 21.92*** 16.79*** 
                                    Note: The IV regressions using the share of Labour voters also include the 
contemporaneous share of Labour voters from the General Election in June 2015. Robust 
standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at local 


















Table 3: Effect of house prices on number of care homes and rate of market entry 
   Number of care homes per population 65 +  Rate of market entry 
      (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average house prices 
(log)   -0.3518*** -0.8752*** -0.4657** -0.5051***   -0.2053  -2.1529 -2.4421** -2.4234** 
      (0.078) (0.212) (0.181) (0.172)   (0.516) (1.531) (1.241) (1.207) 
Estimation     OLS IV  IV IV   OLS IV  IV IV 
Observations   630 630 630 630   630 630 630 630 
Number of local authorities 315 315 315 315   315 315 315 315 
R-squared     0.1155 -0.0270 0.1139 0.1102   0.0080 -0.0184 -0.0205 -0.0200 
Change of delay     x   x     x   x 
Share of Labour voters        x x       x x 
Density population 1911     x x x     x x x 
Note: The IV regressions using the share of Labour voters also include the contemporaneous share of Labour voters from the General 
Election in June 2015. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at local authority level. 







Table 4: Effect of lagged house prices on number of care homes and rate of market entry 
      Number of care homes per population 65 +    Rate of market entry 
      (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged average house 
prices (log)   -0.3485*** -0.8413*** -0.4624*** -0.4991***   -0.2022 -2.0744 -2.3253* -2.3159** 
      (0.081) (0.207) (0.173) (0.165)   (0.526) (0.568) (1.197) (1.168) 
Estimation     OLS IV  IV IV   OLS IV  IV IV 
Observations   630 630 630 630   630 630 630 630 
Number of local authorities 315 315 315 315   315 315 315 315 
R-squared     0.1121 -0.0098 0.1116 0.1086   0.0080  -0.0155 -0.0160 -0.0157 
F statistic of instruments     11.21*** 21.02*** 16.06***     11.21*** 21.02*** 16.06*** 
Change of delay     x   x     x   x 
Share of Labour voters        x x       x x 
Density population 1911     x x x     x x x 
Note: The IV regressions using the share of Labour voters also include the contemporaneous share of Labour voters from the General 
Election in June 2015. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at local authority level. 







Table 5: Effects of house prices on capacity 
      New registered beds   Average size 
      (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average house prices 
(log)   -4.0768 -3.655 -13.039 -7.713   -3.6455 0. 0328 -13.367* -8.038 
      (5.330) (11.003) (8.607) (8.956)   (3.938) (8.841) (6.555) (6.602) 
Estimation     OLS IV  IV IV   OLS IV  IV IV 
Observations   630 630 630 630   630 630 630 630 
Number of local authorities 315 315 315 315   315 315 315 315 
R-squared     0.0150 0.0150 0.0094 0.0151   0.0118 0.0098 -0.0015 0.0090 
Change of delay     x   x     x   x 
Share of Labour voters        x x       x x 
Density population 1911     x x x     x x x 
Note: The IV regressions using the share of Labour voters also include the contemporaneous share of Labour voters from the General 
Election in June 2015. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at local authority level. 









Table 6: Effects of house prices on care homes by quality rating 
      Quality outstanding   Quality bad 
      (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average house prices 
(log)   0.0019 0.0107 0.0118* 0.0105  -0.1655*** -0.2218*** -0.0826 -0.1032 
      (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.036) (0.083) (0.075) (0.071) 
Estimation     OLS IV  IV IV   OLS IV  IV IV 
Observations   630 630 630 630   630 630 630 630 
Number of local authorities 315 315 315 315   315 315 315 315 
R-squared     0.0748 0.0552 0.0501 0.0561   0.2106 0.2051 0.2003 0.2047 
Change of delay     x   x     x   x 
Share of Labour voters        x x       x x 
Density population 1911     x x x     x x x 
Note: The IV regressions using the share of Labour voters also include the contemporaneous share of Labour voters from the General 
Election in June 2015. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at local authority level. 




















































Figure 4: Number of care homes and average rate of delay 
 
 
 
 
